in a supervisory position, since it has to decide whether the Hoge Raad in the contested ruling has violated EU law. In the case of the KLM/Air France flyers the court rejected the claim, but one can imagine that the court would have asked preliminary questions to the ECJ. That would have placed the ECJ in a likewise supervisory position, with not only the power to have the last word in the issue at hand, but also the means to enforce it (by civil liability). This, of course, is a far cry from a judicial dialogue, in which the ECJ and the highest domestic courts keep on deliberating in a continuous discussion until the issues are solved.
Assuming that the Köbler-ruling is not such a brute usurpation of judicial power, we should provide a better interpretation. 15 The most likely interpretation is that the ECJ considers liability of a Member State for a ruling of its highest court as a kind of emergency provision, meant to keep the national courts within the lines of the ECJ´s case law, but hardly meant to be used.
From a strategic point of view it makes sense to try to keep the domestic courts in pace with established case law of the ECJ and informing them about the consequences if they should trespass. This fits well with the function of the preliminary reference which is to serve the dialogue between the courts, and not to serve legal protection. 16 The execution of the sanction however -in the form of a judgment that there is a sufficiently serious breach -would end that dialogue. Therefore it is a safe guess that the ECJ would be unwilling to execute that sanction too easily or swiftly. As a matter of fact, there is no extensive case law in the slipstream of the the ECJ (which sees this provision as an interest to be balanced against other interests).
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What we learn from this summary of the relevant case law of the BVerfG is that it has claimed the last word as well, long before the ECJ did so in the Köbler-case. 24 Up until now, however, it has never used this self-created right to the last word (it remains to be seen what it will decide in the pending case on the decision of the European Central Bank to issue a scheme for Outright 17 See Juliane Kokott, Report on Germany, in: Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and J. Monetary Transactions, see below). There may be several reasons for this. The first is of course that the BVerfG indeed succeeded in exerting decisive influence on the case law of the ECJ most of the time; it turned out to be very effective in its dialogue with the ECJ, as the mentioned case law illustrates. The second reason might be that the actual use of the last word would in fact end the dialogue, which may have more serious consequences than not having it your way in this specific case. This is illustrated by the Czech Constitutional court, which has adopted the ultra vires-doctrine of the BVerfG in its dialogue with the ECJ, but in fact did use its self-claimed right to the last word on one occasion. The case Landtová was about the right to a retirement pension under a regulation that was agreed upon after the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The
Administrative High Court and the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic disagreed about the application of this regulation, however, and the first made a preliminary reference. The ECJ applied the rules of free movement and thus ruled in favor of the referring court, leaving the Constitutional Court in frustration. 25 When the Constitutional Court had to judge a similar complaint in another case, it ruled that the decision of the ECJ was ultra vires, since the application of the rules of free movement to the situation after the separation was said to be "a denial of European history". 26 So the ECJ decision was explicitly defied. For the first time in its history, the ECJ was resisted by a domestic court. 27 On the other hand, the Constitutional Court was outvoted by the ECJ and the Administrative High Court which caused a loss of authority. 28 So, while a threat of non-compliance may be an effective instrument of judicial dialogue -especially when issued by a powerful court like the BVerfG (compare the mentioned case law) -it may backlash at the domestic court (as the Landtová-case illustrates).
The cases mentioned show that the dialogues between the ECJ and the national courts sometimes display characteristics of a chicken game: who will be the first to blink with the eyes? An illustration is offered by the still pending case on the decision of the European Central Bank (ECB) to issue a scheme for Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). The BVerfG made a preliminary reference, after having ruled that this scheme is not in conformity with EU law.
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This was the first preliminary reference of the BVerfG to the ECJ. In the light of its Honeywell-25 ECJ 22 june 2011, Case C-399/09 (Landtová). The frustration was increased by the fact that the Constitutional Court had tried to intervene in the trial at the ECJ, but had been denied access. 26 Constitutional Court 31 january 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12 (Slovak Pensions). 27 Of course, this was not necessary. According to the Constitutional Court´s own standards, it could and should have made a preliminary reference before deciding that the ruling was ultra vires (see the Honeywell-ruling ruling, this bears a special meaning; the purpose of the reference is not to invite the ECJ to deliver its authoritative interpretation on EU law, but to invite the ECJ to join the BVerfG in its authoritative interpretation. Now that the ECJ has ruled differently than the BVerfG 30 , the question is: will the BVerfG back off, or will it defy the ruling of the ECJ? Will it be the first to blink with the eyes?
The resemblance with the chicken game is a telling one, because game theory can indeed be useful to provide further insight. The starting-point of this perspective is the distinction between a communicative attitude of courts towards each other (which aims at cooperation) and a strategic attitude (which aims at influencing the case law of the other court). Some scholars have stressed the first 31 , others have acknowledged the last, while in fact most of the time they are both at play (see also section 5). 32 Domestic courts can cooperate with transnational courts while at the same time negotiating the terms of the cooperation, which raises the question of their bargaining strategies. A helpful tool from game theory is the hawk dove-game, in which two players compete over a resource and have to decide whether to be assertive (the hawk) or to show restraint (the dove). When both play dove, they will have to share the resource. If one player chooses to play hawk while the other plays dove, he will win (the best possible outcome).
If both play hawk they will have to share the resource, but at the expense of a conflict (the worst possible outcome). So, each of the players has an interest in convincing the other of its hawkish intentions, in order to influence the other to play dove.
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Applied to the interaction between the ECJ and the domestic courts, the rivalrous good at stake is the jurisdiction of the respective courts. Both the domestic courts and the ECJ have institutional interests in jurisdictional disputes which resemble the structure of the hawk dovegame. Again, we can distinguish four possibilities. 34 If both the domestic court and the ECJ exert restraint (play dove), they share jurisdiction which entails that neither influences the case law of the other. But if one of the courts is assertive and the other one shows restraint, the assertive (hawkish) court will succeed in influencing the case law of the other. In the Union as a whole, the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EU law are intended to guarantee that EU law prevails. Of course, the acceptance of these doctrines was not evident from the start. 37 As we saw, the BVerfG negotiated it for a better human right protection in the Sometimes the ECJ is remarkably sensitive to national interests. 43 A notorious problem for legal systems with a constitutional court can be the problem of parallel references, both to the domestic constitutional court and the ECJ. In those case the question rises which reference has priority. In France it was decided that the reference to the Conseil Constitutionnel had priority over a reference to the ECJ (the so-called "Question Prioritaire de Constitutionalité" or "QPC"). . 43 A classic example is of course the Omega-ruling of the ECJ, in which the court accepted the prohibition of commercialisation of a laser game for the simulation of killing of people in Germany on the ground of public policy, because the game was considered to be offensive of the ´human dignity´ that is guaranteed by the German constitution. The ECJ referred to its case law that the protection of constitutional values may limit European fundamental freedoms. It ruled that the principle of human dignity is a common principle but that its content may vary along lines of time and place (ECJ, Omega, C-36-02).
the QPC with EU law. 44 The ECJ decided in the Melki-ruling that the QPC was in conformity with EU law if the road to the ECJ was not blocked and the rights of the parties under EU law were not infringed. 45 These conditions were exactly identical to those phrased by the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d´État in rulings that were issued 6 weeks before. 46 This clearly shows that the ECJ is willing to engage in dialogue with the national courts, in this case the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d´État (at the expense of the Court de Cassation 47 ). The domestic QPC has survived the ECJ scrutiny.
IV. Sharing jurisdiction
When both the ECJ and the domestic court exert restraint, the result is that jurisdiction is shared and no conflicts arise. As mentioned before (section 1), in the majority of the cases the interaction between the domestic courts and the ECJ operates smoothly, without competing claims over jurisdiction. All those cases illustrate a shared jurisdiction without conflict. This does not exclude, however, that the courts involved may influence each other´s case law, for example when domestic courts follow the ECJ voluntarily (for example when interpreting national law in the spirit of Union law). 
Why domestic courts should engage in judicial dialogues with the ECJ
So far, we have analyzed the structure of the dialogues of the ECJ and the domestic courts, and we have found a recurring pattern: courts often claim the last word, without using it. Another question is the justification of this pattern: are there good reasons for claiming the last word, without using it? From the perspective of game theory the affirmative answer is twofold. First, courts should claim the last word, since that is the most effective way to influence the other participants in the dialogue. As we have seen in the hawk dove-game, it is effective to convince the others of one´s own assertiveness (in order to stimulate them to exert restraint). At the same time, however, the courts involved should refrain from using the claimed last word in case they prefer a continuous dialogue over a jurisdictional conflict. So, maximizing influence while avoiding conflict, may be very good reasons for this strategy. On a more abstract level, however, the question rises of the legitimacy of the strategic engagement in judicial dialogues.
What good reasons are there, if any, for strategically engaging in dialogue over the only available alternative: installing one court with decisive authority over the other? There are two kinds of answers to this question, and they are both valid.
The first is the institutional line of reasoning, resulting in the conclusion that an institutional balance in the EU needs the ECJ to function within a system of checks and balances, rather than at the apex of the judicial pyramid. This is very much in line with the origins of the notion of a judicial dialogue in the national context, of course, in which it is meant to offer compensation for the counter-majoritarian difficulty (section 1). Besides, it has been observed by many that Instead, I will move on to a second, substantive line of reasoning, namely that a balanced development of EU law by the courts requires that both domestic interests and values and EU purposes and goals are taken into account. As a matter of fact, this is a principle of EU law, since article 4 section 2 TEU states that the Union shall respect the national identity of the Member States "inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government." As we have seen, this provision was already at the heart of the Lisbon-ruling of the BVerfG, which interpreted it as an absolute proviso against EU measures considered to be intrusive to the German constitutional identity (section 2). why this so-called identity clause promises to be a focal point for the dialogues between the domestic courts and the ECJ the coming years. Although thus far it has been studied mainly from a constitutional point of view, it seems to me to be relevant for the development of European private law as well. This contention, however, needs further explanation.
The identity clause was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which implied a major step forward to an ever closer European Union. This step towards integration was balanced by the introduction of principles safeguarding national autonomy, such as the identity clause. The
Lisbon Treaty went further along this road, both in strengthening the EU, and in the codification of the identity clause in its final wording. 51 What is meant by respect for "national identity" is still utterly vague, of course. What is more, it is an essentially contested concept, to be continuously discussed by domestic courts and the ECJ, amongst others. In the footsteps of the Lisbon-ruling of the BVerfG, several constitutional courts have sent signals to the Union that they will protect their "constitutional identity" from intrusion by EU law. 52 Up until now the ECJ has ruled six times on article 4 section 2: once before 2010, and five times afterwards.
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The Court however has never found an EU legislative act to be in violation of the clause, nor has it ever invalidated a Union measure for violation of the principle of subsidiarity. 54 Still, the Court not only enforces the identity clause, it is itself (as an institution of the EU) bound by it as well. As such, it may show more or less sensitivity for Member State´s identities.
study on "National identity and EU law" Elke Cloots concludes that "its jurisprudence does not seem to be informed by a principled and coherent vision of the relationship between European integration and respect for national identity." 56 Moreover, she observes a certain reluctance and a lack of enthusiasm on the side of the ECJ with regard to the identity clause: "One can only guess why the court for such a long time has been far less eager to highlight the fact that the comparison of the German and the Dutch constitutional identity shows the first to be rather "total", and the last to be more "modest". 64 In a constitution like the German, one should not be surprised that family law is part of its constitutional identity. 65 The notion of a national identity, on the other hand, refers to such characteristics as a distinctive shared history, territory, culture, language, a common society and institutions (like media, schools, economic life), and shared origin, on the other hand, brings in its own social justice conception which need not necessarily coincide with those of the Member States. The European legal order is at least partly based on a more procedural notion of social justice that guarantees equal access to its citizens ("access justice"), which contains two elements: first, breaking down the barriers which limit participation and access and, second, strengthening the position of consumers and workers with a view to enforcing their rights. This may be at odds with domestic law, as the case law on age discrimination illustrates (section 2). 66 Cloots, p. 165 -170. In ECJ 22 september 2010, ECLI:NL:XX:2010:BP0385, nr. C-208/09 (Ilonka SaynWittgenstein) the Court accepted under article 4 section 2 TEU the regulation of nobility titles as a means to serve the principle of equality. 67 In the case-law of the ECJ the requirement of a certain nationality can be a precondition for the protection of national identity too, but has to be pass the proportionality-test (ECJ 2 july 1996, ECLI:NL is simply that certain aspects of the Member State´s private law systems are so fundamental for society that they may fall within the scope of the identity clause, which means that they deserve the respect of the institutions of the Union (the ECJ included) under article 4 section 2 TEU.
What this means is not at all certain, but in any case it mandates a "nation-sensitive, differentiated construction of EU law". 72 An example is recently offered by Advocate-General Kokott, responding to an intervention of the French government in a Belgian case on discrimination on the ground of religion (a female employee was refused to wear an Islamic headscarf in the workplace). France had claimed that Directive 2000/78 is limited to the competences of the Union and is therefore not to be applied in situations where the national identity of Member States is involved (in cases like these its constitutional principle of secularity or "laïcité" is at stake). The Advocate-General replied that the upshot of article 4 section 2 TEU is not that certain subject areas or areas of activity are entirely removed from the scope of Directive 2000/78, but that the application of the directive -that is: the interpretation of the principle of equal treatment which it contains and of the grounds of justification for any differences of treatment -must not adversely affect the national identities of Member States.
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Another illustration is offered by the case of the KLM/Air France flyers, with which I started.
A rigorous application of the prohibition of age-discrimination would certainly grant a continued participation of the flyers in the labor-process after the age of 55. However, this would be achieved at the expense of young flyers, just graduated with a heavy load of debts because of high study-costs, who find the entry to possible jobs blocked by their elderly collegues. When the career-path of the flyers is taken into account -which is based on a salary that is adjusted to an early retirement -then it is not at all evident that the mentioned goal is served by proportionate means. What is more important, however, is that the way the balance is struck by the domestic court, deserves serious consideration of the ECJ (when asked). State´s conception of its own national identity. 75 After all, it is their identity that is at stake.
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Between Scylla and Charibdis, there is an in-between position in the claim that neither the ECJ nor domestic courts should have the last word in matters of national identity alone, but that they should engage in a dialogue. This fits very well with actual practice (section 2), but at the same time it constitutes a justification of that practice. Striking the balance between integration and accommodation is and should be the result of a joint cooperation in judicial lawmaking. Cloots, the execution of such a threat constitutes a breach of the primacy of EU law and should therefore be a remedy of last resort, to be executed only after first making a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ: "Only if the ECJ fails to seize this opportunity to accommodate the State´s national identity, or at least to explain why integration must prevail over accommodation in the case at hand, the national court may consider actually carrying out its threat to set aside EU law." 79 This comes down to claiming the last word on national identity, as we have phrased it, without necessarily using it.
So, it is judicial dialogue after all that should determine the final outcome in cases where a
Member State´s national identity is at stake. However, a qualification may be in order here.
Cloots suggests a rule-like approach instead of discretionary power of the courts involved in the dialogue, since none of them can be presupposed to strike the balance right. The ECJ might be expected to be more receptive to integration-based arguments, as the domestic courts might be expected to be more sensitive to identity-based arguments. For this reason she proposes a rule-based approach, limiting the discretionary power of both the ECJ and the domestic courts in the domains of potential conflict. 80 One can imagine that the proportionality test in the case of the KLM/Air France-flyers, for example, is replaced by some rule of thumb or guiding principle about the relative importance of the interests involved. Although one may sympathize with the attempt to improve the process of balancing integration and accommodation, I question the solution proposed, if only for the reason that these rules or principles are in need of interpretation on their turn (and so on, ad infinitum). 81 In the end, it is the attitude of the (members of the) courts involved that is decisive for the way they strike the balance between integration and accommodation. A dialogue presupposes that the participants are ready to listen to the contribution of the other participants, which implies the intention to take competing interests and values into account and to compromise them in the case at hand.
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One may consider this to be idealistic, referring to the practice of courts setting default-lines, making threats, having it their own way. In this line it is claimed by Faraguna, referring to the 79 Cloots, p. 184. 80 Cloots, p. 210 -215. 81 Compare Wittgenstein´s paradox of rule-following. 82 A method for this process of weighing and balancing -although outside the specific context of national identity -is developed by Sieburgh, who distinguishes between three kinds of EU principles: (i) principles that do not have a private law nature, like the principles of primacy and direct effect (which have to be integrated in horizontal relations), (ii) principles that do not originate from private law but are recognized in private law, like the principles of equality or legal certainty (which again may involve a balancing act), and (iii) principles that originate from private law such as the principle of unjust enrichment (which may be shaped by the domestic courts as co-creators and co-developers) (Sieburgh 2013. p. 1176 -1177).
OMT-case, that judicial dialogue in action is more like a "deaf ultimatum" when such vital interests of a Member State are at stake. Since the identity clause is a judicial "nuclear weapon" the risk of a "judicial cold war" between the ECJ and the BVerfG is substantial. 83 Instead of putting confidence in "the miraculous effect of the so-called judicial dialogue" we would do better to look for other solutions than the "myth of the so-called judicial dialogue". 84 After questioning the judicial monopoly on the identity clause, Faraguna advocates legislative means to take national interests into account (like enhanced cooperation arrangements, opt-outs, exemptions, protocols, etcetera). As far as his criticism on judicial dialogues is concerned, it rests on a misconceived notion of judicial dialogue. As we have seen, a dialogue between courts is characterized (as any dialogue) by both strategic and communicative characteristics (section 2). Only a focus on the last can lead one to the conclusion that judicial dialogue in action is far less peaceful than in theory. In the dialogue on the OMT-case there were threats and caveats, for sure, but the dialogue isn´t over yet. As we have seen, courts often claim the last word, but they rarely use it. For the rest, Faraguna clearly has more confidence in the legislator than in the judiciary to flesh out the identity-clause, but that is outside the scope of this paper. 
How domestic courts should engage in judicial dialogues with the ECJ
After questioning the structure and the legitimacy of judicial dialogues between the domestic courts and the ECJ, I finally turn to the issue of their effectiveness: how should these dialogues be conducted, if they are to serve the aforementioned purposes? If the domestic courts really want the ECJ to take into account national viewpoints, interests and values in the development of European private law, they will have to provide counterweight. 86 Claiming the last word is a form of counteraction, but that strategy is in fact only an option for the most powerful courts (like the BVerfG). Does that leave the less powerful courts helpless, without any possible strategy? No, less powerful courts can operate strategically too, for example by trying to find friends or allies for their viewpoints which may have roots in various national legal systems.
An example would be the scope of the principle of "ne bis in idem" in EU law, which raises the question (amongst others) whether "idem" means "idem factum" (same fact) or "idem crimen" There is more to this. In particular cases the domestic courts can attempt to seduce the ECJ to take the national context into account by providing it with more (detailed) information. In general, the expertise of the deciding panel of the ECJ is not always evident. As a rule, there is no judge from the referring legal system on the panel, as is the case in the ECtHR. Besides, there is little specialized knowledge of civil law in the ECJ. For these reasons it is important to provide the ECJ with (detailed) information on the legal and social context of the questions asked, on the values involved, as well as on the expected effects of different possible answers. 90 It may be helpful too, to inform the ECJ on which answer would best fit in the domestic needs and aspirations. In short, the dialogue is not to be conceived as just an exchange of questions and answers, but as an opportunity for a rich debate on all possible viewpoints from different angles. The ECJ then, is not to be considered as just a helpdesk for all the courts´ questions on EU law, it is to be treated as a true partner in dialogue, to be informed, helped, influenced, motivated, seduced, and even warned for the consequences of its decisions. 91 If the ECJ is thus invited to engage in a dialogue -understood as a rich debate -it has to respond (on its turn) to These claims entail an agenda for both the ECJ and the domestic courts in their lawmaking cooperation. First, they both have to consider whether the notion of national identity could be an important vehicle for a balanced development of Union law that includes the development of private law as well. As we have seen, article 4 section 2 TEU has been discovered by the constitutional courts only, and has been neglected for the most part by the ECJ. Could private law interests fall within the scope of article 4 section 2 TEU as well? Can they be fitted in the conceptual scheme of the ECJ of rights and freedoms? The only way to find out for the respective courts is to engage in a dialogue on the interpretation of this provision. Since the interpretation of article 4 section 2 TEU is the authority of the ECJ, but the expertise on national identity is in the domestic courts, there is not last word here. Next, both the ECJ and the domestic courts have to improve on the quality of their dialogues, in the sense that these dialogues have to be richer in informational and discursive content. This requires more effort from both sides, both in providing background information on the domestic context (by the domestic court) and in reasoned judgments on the balance struck between integration and accommodation (by the ECJ). Again, this is only served by continuous dialogue, so there is no last word here either. Finally, both the domestic courts and the ECJ can influence one another´s case law strategically by making moves, forecasting responses, and claiming the last word. This is not so much a matter of a peaceful dialogue or violent warfare, as is often claimed, but of strategic decision-making within a cooperative enterprise. There seems to be a last word here, but it exists only virtually. As we have seen, the last word appears to be nothing more or less than a strategic claim in a continuous dialogue.
A last word
Of course, there is no last word on this. There are at least two other perspectives on the notion of the last word, to be distinguished and reserved for different kinds of doctrinal research. First, the notion of the last word has constitutional meaning, since it refers to the question of ultimate authority in a pluralistic legal order like the EU. As we have seen, in such a legal order one may focus on conflict and rivalry, or on openness and dialogue (section 2). The first perspective is justified by the observation that domestic courts and the ECJ tend to defend their interpretative autonomy and that they have clashed on fundamental rights protection, ultra vires review, and national identity review. The second perspective is justified by the observation that, despite these differences, domestic courts and the ECJ have influenced one another and have succeeded in establishing a pluralist equilibrium. As Kaarlo Tuori has rightfully claimed, article 4 section 2 TEU implies acknowledgement of constitutional diversity. At a deeper level of these dialogues a common constitutional culture is at play -a shared language and a common understanding -that prevents latent constitutional crises to break out.
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The other perspective on the notion of the last word, is that of private law. For the doctrinal researcher in European private law there is work to do with regard to the mapping of specific judicial dialogues, thus contributing to our understanding of the formation and development of European private law. Only through the analysis of specific dialogues -with an eye to the mutual contribution and influence of domestic courts and the ECJ -can we bring to light how case law is developed on the foundations of the domestic private law systems and Union law regulation. This requires not only a deep understanding of both the case law of the highest domestic courts and of the ECJ, but also a conceptual grip on their interplay. Here the doctrinal work of Arthur Hartkamp in the field of European private law has paved the way, both with regard to the design of the conceptual framework needed and the analysis of the relevant case law. As such, it has provided a vast contribution to a doctrinal dialogue, in which the last word has not been spoken yet. 94 Kaarlo Tuori, European constitutionalism, Cambridge: Cambrige University Press 2015, p. 102 -107.
